1
An Emerging Order

We write in this book about the remaking of schooling in Western Europe, and the policy orthodoxy – promoted by supranational organisations, shared across frontiers – that is so powerful an influence upon it. We draw much from others who have worked in this field before us – from theorists who have analysed the scalar shift in policymaking from national to supranational level; from sociologists who have traced both the classic patterns of schooling's regulation and their new forms; and from those who have delineated the repertoire and discursive nuances of the new world order in education.[1] To this now-abundant literature, we bring something of our own. Our particular interest is in the contestation that attends supranational policy orthodoxy – how its arrival within the major countries of Western Europe has been the occasion for widespread criticism, discontent and mobilisation. This terrain, on which are fought out disputes central to the ways in which Europe's present is understood and its future imagined, has not been so well explored by researchers, even when their sympathies have been engaged by those who challenge the new order.

The vantage point from which we interpret these disputes, and make sense of the changes that are reshaping the school, does not stand outside the territory of contestation. Our own formation as teachers and researchers has been affected by participation in movements that have sought change at the level of the classroom and the school, as part of a much wider political and economic transformation. We are thus aware that educational change is better seen not as the simple realisation of a policy design but as an outcome of purposive activity (and conflict) at many levels, from the local to the international. More specifically, our book is influenced by the positions and actions of the social forces that have been mobilised against what we think oppositional social

movements justly call the neo-liberal project. We take neo-liberalism – whose general features and educational impact we sketch in the pages that follow – to be best understood as an aggressive programme, that self-consciously sets for itself the goal of achieving change of an epochal kind; it aims to defeat the movements associated with an earlier phase of state-focused, welfare-orientated reform and to install a new systemic logic by means of which societies respond at every level – from individual to governmental – to free-market imperatives. Our book is organised around various instances of this process of combative transformation, in which policy redesign is always accompanied by a concern for political tactics, and in which the forcefulness of opposition is a significant variable in the success or failure of educational programmes.

We are protagonists as well as commentators, then, but protagonists on the part of movements that are now, despite occasional spectacular victories – France 2005 – primarily defensive ones. And since the neo-liberal programme has been the dominant agenda-setting force in the post-1990 educational landscape, to focus on its achievements is also to recognise the strategic and intellectual problems of those traditions against which it has been directed. The educational systems that it is seeking to transform were created, in part, by popular aspirations for increased equality and social citizenship; and to a significant, though never determining, extent, schools in Western Europe were for a period home to values and practices embodying solidarities of a sort resistant to the logic of the market, and strong enough even now to mobilise enduring protest. We owe our cultural and political formation to just such solidarities, and to this extent our book is grounded on the historic achievements of the last half-century. But we do not intend merely to celebrate a movement which in so many respects now finds itself on the defensive, an altermondialist optimism heavily qualified by a long succession of defeats. At the end of his book on social change in Western Europe the sociologist Colin Crouch acknowledged that 'the most energetic point of social power emerging in late twentieth century society was that of a globalising capitalism'. Surveying the opposition to capitalism's transforming energies, he noted 'the assembly of non-capitalist interests' embodied in the movements and institutions of the post-war era, and asked what is for us an essential question. Is this assembly 'simply a dead weight carried over from the past, or does it contain a potentiality for new action?'[2] It is with the exploration of this open question that our book is concerned, and our analysis and critique cut two ways: against a neo-liberalism whose programme promotes social and educational division while at the same time it narrows drastically the potential

scope of education; and against a left that has not yet made sense of new conditions, nor created (in most instances) a credible basis for counter-mobilisation. It is from this double perspective-returned to in our concluding chapter – that we interpret policy shifts and political conflicts.

Then and now

For six decades, education in Western Europe has experienced continuous and accelerating expansion. In most of pre-war Europe, the elementary school – connected to no system of qualification – marked for most students the limits of their education; universities were in effect closed to all but a tiny minority. Since 1945, secondary education has developed, even in Southern Italy and rural Spain, to become universal – the countries where secondary education was poorly developed have caught up. Levels of certification are rising – with spectacular increases in the numbers of students taking public examinations. Access to higher education has been broadened to the point where it is possible to speak in some countries of the 'mass' university. And beyond the limits of a school and university system in which students pass an increasing part of their lives, governments project for their populations a future of 'lifelong learning'.[3]

In many respects, the pace of these developments has quickened over the last 15 years – it is in this period that the proportion of French students taking the baccalauréat has exceeded 60%, and in which the British government has set a target of 50% participation in higher education by 2010. At the same time, the requirements that policymakers place upon education are multiplying. Schools, colleges and universities are expected to take over many of the functions of the workplace as places where skills are developed and where the dispositions necessary for productive employment are formed. In societies that have become ethnically more diverse and economically more polarised, they are thought central to the management of cultural difference and the promotion of social inclusion. For students and for parents, they have taken on a new centrality, as providers of the credentials without which careers in the 'knowledge society' become hard to construct. In short, education – its demographic spread, its length and complexity, its importance to the lives of students– is more central to Western European societies than at any previous time.

In some senses, the developments of the last 15 years are a continuation of much earlier tendencies towards educational expansion and towards the inclusion of ever-larger sections of the population within formal education systems. But they have taken place in a new economic, social

and political context, marked by a profound economic and financial restructuring, whose coherence can be grasped through the term 'neo-liberalism'. Economically, neo-liberalism involves the internationalisation of production systems, the free movement of capital across national frontiers, the centrality of financial interests, deindustrialisation and the growth of the service sector and privatisation; at the social level, it involves increasing polarisation of wealth and poverty – often of a racialised kind – and a growing mobility and precariousness among large sections of the workforce. Politically, there has been both a contraction of the state and an intensification of its focus. David Harvey's lucid presentation suggests the coherence of these processes:

> Neo-liberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedom and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices ... If markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture.[4]

In practice, Harvey makes clear, the state's role is far from the minimal one that pristine neo-liberalism suggests:

> The process of neo-liberalisation has ... entailed much 'creative destruction', not only of prior institutional frameworks and powers (even challenging traditional forms of state sovereignty) but also of divisions of labour, social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life and thought, reproductive activities, attachments to the land and habits of the heart.[5]

In this work of 'bringing all human action into the domain of the market', the role of the state – in destroying previous social arrangements and in creating the legal, social and political framework for the expansion of neo-liberalism – is crucial. Yet the capacities of the state are often disavowed by governments. It has become a policymaking orthodoxy to claim that governments have little power to halt or differently inflect the economic forces which shape contemporary societies – they must submit to free market globalisation and to the agenda of the institutions which further its projects. But at the same time, though acquiescent in

relation to market trends, governments know they must in other ways be ceaselessly active, reshaping their social systems to respond to new exigencies – creating, in Tony Blair's words, 'a competitive basis of physical infrastructure and human skill' and managing the social conflicts attendant upon neo-liberal change.[6] The transformation of education is central to this reshaping, and has accordingly been placed at the centre of the agenda of national governments, and, increasingly, of the European Union itself. No aspect of education systems – from financing to forms of selection, from pedagogy to questions of management – is spared the critical scrutiny of governments committed to market-driven change.

In this book, we trace the impact of these processes on the school systems of England,[7] France, Germany, Italy and Spain. In each case, the effects are significant and continuing: it is possible to speak of a policy orthodoxy that affects all countries, and owes much to the interaction of the programmes of national governments with the work of international organisations – the European Union and the OECD, in particular – whose policy repertoire is growing in influence. But this orthodoxy is not, as it were, inscribed on blank and receptive surfaces. Its policies interact with national systems which bear the multiple marks of other social interests, and whose histories vary considerably. It combines in varying ways with already established conservative interests – business, the churches, educational hierarchies and philosophies. It confronts more (France) or less (England) organised opposition that draws from national traditions of educational reform and contestation. It has at its disposal state apparatuses whose competence and effectivity differ markedly from country to country. Thus, while it is possible to speak of a globalised policy agenda, this agenda – *pace* the influence of EU and OECD – takes different forms in different places – differences that we try to register throughout the chapters that follow. But in all cases, across very different national situations, there is one connecting thread: the new agenda has to work to defeat or assimilate the institutions, practices, values and social agents that were formed within an earlier educational order, and were shaped by reforming impulses of a markedly different kind. To make sense of contemporary educational conflicts, and of the difficulties that policy orthodoxy encounters, we need to sketch this earlier history.

Post-war reform

Difference and commonality: we will attempt to attend to both. Across the five countries, there are certainly common tendencies of development. 'Modernisation' – albeit belated in Spain and Southern Italy – has been

their shared experience. Likewise, all have been affected to a greater or lesser degree by movements whose scope has been international: anti-fascism, 1968 – the *sessantotto* – and, in a different key, the complex of ideas and practices which has been called 'progressive education' or *Reformpedagogik*. But the tempo and extent of these influences differ widely from one country to another. The most important line of difference here separates those states where workers' movements were strengthened in the course of the conflict with fascism, from those where these movements suffered defeats on a scale which left them for a long period disorganised to the point where they could not play a significant role in the shaping of post-war settlements. France, Italy and England stand on one side of this line, the Germany of Adenauer and the Spain of Franco on the other. In all countries, the characteristic demands of the post-war period for expansion and greater equality were felt, but the pace at which they were answered, and the forms which the answers took, varied according to the relative capacities of popular and conservative interests. The resulting pattern of unevenness retains its force today.

We can nonetheless attempt to summarise the elements of a common history. Eric Hobsbawm calls the 1950s the start of capitalism's golden age, 'when even weak economies like the British flourished and grew'.[8] Production increased rapidly, and industrialisation brought about an epochal shift of population from rural to urban areas. Rising wages allowed higher levels of consumption, sustaining the long boom of the post-war period. State spending – military and social – was likewise both an effect of economic expansion and a means of supporting it. Education was part of this general movement. As Papadopoulos puts it, in his insider's history of the OECD, governments throughout Western Europe worked in the belief that 'more and better education (was) an end in itself and at the same time one of the most important factors in economic growth'. Between 1960 and 1980, education spending grew at an unprecedented speed: in France from 2.4% of GDP to 5%; in West Germany from 2.9% to 4.7%; in Italy from 3.6% to 4.4%; and in Britain from 4.3% to 5.6%. Even in Francoist Spain, the 1970 Ley General de Educación prompted a doubling of expenditure in this period to 2.6%.[9] Human capital theory – premised on the belief that educational investment increased productivity and stimulated economic growth – provided a rationale for this expansion,[10] but as Papadopoulos notes, there were other motivations too. The inclusive and progressivist rhetoric of these decades owed something to the terms of the post-war settlement, in which notions of democracy and social citizenship were prominent.

The Education Act passed by the British parliament in 1944 was the culmination of a long campaign by the labour movement for 'secondary education for all'. In the aftermath of fascism, the post-war constitution of the Italian Republic declared that education was a universal right, and guaranteed the intellectual freedom of teachers. In France, the 1946 constitution spoke of 'equal access' to education, training and culture; and the Langevin-Wallon report of 1947 had insisted that the task of education was a broad one – to construct 'the man, the citizen, the worker'.[11] Schooling was thus at the heart of 'a political project concerning the social tie' and became a means by which an educator-state could construct 'a public, national space'.[12]

This was the climate in which secondary education was expanded to involve groups new to secondary levels of education. In England, the school-leaving age was raised to 15 in 1947. In France the Berthoin reforms undertaken by the Fifth Republic in 1959 extended compulsory education to the age of 16. In Italy, where both industrialisation and mass scholarisation occurred at a relatively late point, the proportion of 14-year olds attending school rose from 20% in 1945 to 59% in 1962.[13] Accompanying these changes, which brought a new population into the secondary school, was a promise of equal opportunity, defined primarily in terms of access to schooling for working-class groups.

A second wave of reform

Almost from the beginning the legitimacy of the new educational systems was called into question by precisely those groups which had been addressed by the rhetoric of inclusive change. Expansion was to an important extent driven by demand – the demand of new sections of students and parents for higher levels of qualification. But from their view point, the systems of universal secondary education established after 1945 were restrictive, and the notion of equal opportunity on which they were based seemed largely of a formal character. 'Secondary education for all' meant no more than access for students of different social classes to types of school that differed widely and systematically in the type of progression to which they led. In the Italy of the 1960s, the numbers attending secondary school almost doubled, but – as Lumley argues – 'under the rhetoric of egalitarianism that proclaimed education as "a right for all" there was a strong current of meritocratic and technocratic thinking that clouded any perception of the emergence of new forms of discrimination and selection within the reformed secondary school'.[14] The English experience was similar: most secondary school

students attended institutions from which they would enter the labour market with no qualifications; in the early 1960s, only some 20% took public examinations at 16. In France, following Berthoin, the establishment in 1963 of the *carte scolaire* – linking school attendance to place of residence – marked an attempt to promote social mixing. The creation in the same year of *collèges d'enseignement secondaire* for 11- to 15-year olds brought together under one roof three different types of education, from pre-*lycéen* to pre-vocational. There was little possibility of student transfer between these streams, however, and there were vastly different prospects for the different student groups.[15] In West Germany, the numbers attending the *Gymnasium* – the academic secondary school – doubled between 1965 and 1970, without a significant lessening of the institution's social selectivity.[16] The class basis of these separatist arrangements was plainly demonstrated by sociological research in several countries,[17] and was unattractive to parents, whose ambitions were not for secondary education *per se* but for access to particular types of credentials. Nor did it satisfy the social democratic parties and teachers' organisations which, pushed from below, were radicalising their policies to call for a single form of unified secondary education, and in some cases to reinterpret educational opportunity less in terms of formal access than of outcome. 'The average woman or negro [*sic*] or proletarian or rural dweller should have the same level of educational attainment as the average male, white, white-collar suburbanite,' wrote the English sociologist and policy adviser A.H. Halsey; 'if not, there has been injustice'.[18]

Under these pressures, educational reform began to assume in some countries a new character, based on comprehensive (i.e. formally non-selective) secondary schooling, and expanded access to publicly recognised qualifications. This was the tendency of English reform after 1965, and was later embodied in Italy in the form of the *scuola media unificata*; Roberto Moscati suggests that in this period the discourse of education reform in Italy centred 'more or less consciously (on) the social division of labour and the class structure of society'.[19] The aftermath of 1968 stimulated a similar project in France. Such influence was strong enough, in France, Italy and England to inhibit the programmes of the right: Gaullism and Christian Democracy presided over the period of reform, and even English Conservatism abandoned for a while its commitment to selective schooling.

Changes in institutional form were accompanied by a modification of school cultures. Policymakers began to recognise that quantitative expansion was not enough: there needed also to be changes in curriculum and in pedagogy. According to Papadopoulos, 'public authorities were forced

to shift their attention to how, coping beyond numbers, their educational offerings could be made relevant to the diversified needs of their vastly expanded and variegated clientèle.'[20] This 'quest for relevance and equality' may often have been fostered by institutions of the central state – in England, the Schools Council, entrusted with curriculum development, was founded in 1963. But in the context of the later 1960s, it was shaped also by other interests, whose force we need to recognise if we are to make full sense of the conflicts that now attend neo-liberal change**.** Between 1968 and 1974, a series of working-class protests and emerging social movements challenged inequalities, claimed rights of participation, demanded recognition and asserted militant identities. In this context, large numbers of teachers, recruited from the generation of 1968, came to think of the school as an institution where democracy, cultural recognition and equal opportunity could serve as central principles. The ideas of Freire became internationally known, the Bolshevik educators of the early 1920s were rediscovered and the (Tuscan) School of Barbiana's critique of established education was widely emulated.[21] The demands of social movements for children's rights, their acute perceptions of the ways in which education served to perpetuate class inequalities at the same time as it proclaimed education for all and their scathing critique of elite and commodified cultures did not provide the norms of the school system. Nor were they entirely coherent in themselves: in contrast to an earlier generation of reformers, the new left of the 1970s was inclined to see the school as an ideological state apparatus, functional to capitalism – yet this did not prevent its immersion in projects aimed at bettering the education of working-class students.

Despite, or perhaps because of, these difficulties, new movements for educational change exercised nonetheless a diffused and potent influence. In all the five countries in this study– including, at a later point, Spain – teachers sought to develop through localised initiatives an education practice that could transform the ways in which schooling connected to the majority of its students. We discuss the sweeping course – and eventual exhaustion – of these developments in a later chapter. Here it is enough to note how they deepened the project of reform: an agenda for schooling should include questions of ideology as well as institutional form, and be attentive to the content of education as much as to questions of access to its higher levels. It needed to be alert to the identities and tacit knowledges of excluded groups and critical of the vested interests embodied in the official curriculum that had 'emptied education of its potential as a means of realisation', preferring abstract slogans of educational freedom to concrete interest in 'society and its needs'.[22] Such an

approach, localised and sympathetic to subordinate cultures, expressed even in its weaker forms an attitude towards education which stood at a distance from economic demands.

These cultural shifts and institutional preferences established a school system that was in some ways resistant to the logic of capital and was thus a provocation to the educational right. The emphasis on child-centred learning in English primary education, for instance, seemed to the Thatcherite policy activists of the 1980s to entail an institutionalised indifference to economic 'requirements'; likewise, to the authors of the EU's Reiffers report in the 1990s the 'fashionable' and non-selective 'utopias' of an earlier period had disconnected education from 'societies, which do not work that way'.[23] But the impact of radical reform – understood as the opening up of higher levels of education and qualification to the mass of students, linked to curriculum change and an emancipatory conception of pedagogy – was in reality more limited than the polemics against it suggested. Despite the verve and energy of alternative or critical educational projects, the curricula and pedagogies developed in earlier periods remained dominant. This was illustrated very clearly by the problems stemming from the French Haby directive of 1975, which instructed *collèges* to organise teaching on an unstreamed basis: schools had neither the finances nor the curricular and pedagogic resources to do so in a generally successful way. It was a similar set of problems which led the Italian employers' organisation, the *Confindustria*, to note the failure of the school system to rise above local initiative and to 'capitalise from the ... experimental programmes it produces'.[24]

Enduring obstacles

Alongside these limitations, there persisted structural inequalities, underpinned by powerful social interests. These were especially clear in Spain and West Germany. Throughout what was in other countries a heyday of reform, the Franco government presided over a highly centralised system in which, despite population change, the number of children receiving pre-school education and compulsory basic education hardly changed between 1940 and 1960, and the number of state secondary schools grew only from 113 to 119; in 1975 only 70% of 14-year olds attended school. Religious interests dominated: more students enrolled in – mainly religious – private schools than in the underfunded state sector. From this base, the Church was in a powerful position to shape the system of the post-Franco period, while the public schools 'lacked both quality and infrastructure'.[25]

West Germany, like Spain, lacked the shaping influence of a strong working-class movement. Post-war education preserved the elitist structure of earlier decades: in the 1950s only 11% of the age cohort were enrolled in the *Gymnasium*, a tiny minority of whom (2%) were from working-class backgrounds. The expansion of the 1960s increased the size of the *Gymnasium*'s intake, without significantly altering its class composition.[26] Nor, in Germany, was the second wave of post-war reform as strong as in other countries. There was certainly a quantitative expansion: by the 1990s the period of compulsory education in Germany was, in most *Länder*, 13 years, the longest of all the five countries in this study.[27] But institutional change was limited and the system continued to be 'based on the idea of grading down all those pupils who can't cope with the standards set by historically evolved curricula and inflexible teaching methods'.[28] Inclusive secondary schools – *Gesamtschulen* – were established in some *Länder*, but these few institutions functioned more as the fourth strand in a differentiated system than as genuine comprehensives. Reform pedagogy became more prominent, especially in elementary schools, and, as in other countries, teachers' curricular and pedagogic autonomy increased. But these changes were not long lasting. The prospects for opening up the spaces of the school to radical experiment were reduced by the 1972 *Radikalenerlaß* law of the Brandt government, 'which soon developed into a weapon against radical students seeking state employment'.[29] The SPD governments of Brandt and Schmidt balked at the confrontation with conservative *Länder* that a thoroughgoing project of school reform would have entailed. Instead, changes focused on the development of a segregated system of post-secondary education, in which – alongside the academic *Gymnasium* – a strong vocational track was established, compulsory for those leaving school at 16, linking school and workplace-based learning and giving a powerful voice to business interests.

Educational change in Spain and Germany was more limited than in other countries. But this does not mean that in England, France and Italy egalitarian reform was fully accomplished. Between 1945 and 1980 education provision expanded and inequalities of access to secondary education were very much reduced. But at other points in the system – access to advanced secondary education and to universities – class-based inequalities remained strong and in some cases actually increased, as middle-class families mobilised their cultural resources to secure the success of their children (see chapter 5). Moreover, within apparently unified systems of primary and secondary education, a variety of formal and informal systems operated – school traditions and reputations,

neighbourhood-based admissions policies, setting and streaming within schools – in which these class-based distinctions were codified. The result was that 'children from lower social backgrounds did not experience an increase in their educational opportunities until higher groups had fully satisfied their demand for it';[30] and when opportunities were at last presented – for instance in higher education – working-class students discovered that there were new hierarchies in which they were not well placed: nearly half the students in the 'top five' British universities were educated in private schools; in Italy, university completion rates were strongly conditioned by students' class background.[31] To this considerable extent, the promise of opportunity made by post-war reform was contradicted by persisting, and in some cases strengthening, patterns of inequality. As French researchers noted, a rise in average levels of attainment disguised increasing and class-related polarities between the most and the least successful students, and access to the most prestigious sectors of higher education – the *grandes écoles* – had become by the 1980s more closely connected to class origins than in earlier decades.[32] (Likewise, in Germany, while equality of opportunity increased in terms of access to middle-level examinations, opportunity at the level of higher education became more unequal.[33])

Alongside these intractable social problems, the reforming movements of the 1960s and 1970s faced other difficulties, connected to entrenched and politically powerful institutions that were hostile to the project of creating uniform, public systems of schooling. In all countries, there remained strong vestiges of this *ancien régime*. Nothing in the reforms of the period threatened the position of the elite English private schools (named 'public schools') whose fee-paying students continued to dominate the most prestigious universities and supply the cadre of the English ruling class. Far from dying away in the 1960s, these schools carried out a successful process of renewal, abandoning their more primitive features (beating, fagging, compulsory military training) and – with substantial funding from industry to support science education – emphasising academic attainment above character formation. Students in the private sector comprised only 7% of the total school population, but by 1980 nearly a third of students obtaining three or more 'A' levels – the 18+ examination which was a pre-requisite for university entrance – were privately educated. Alongside this sector, there still existed a large number of selective state schools, which had survived a process of comprehensive reform that had been left to localised initiative rather than national legislation.

Secular hierarchies of this sort were intertwined with religious influences: Christian organisations retained a privileged educational place. The 1944 reforms in England rested upon an accommodation with the Church of England and with Catholicism, in which operational control of a large sector of primary and secondary education remained with the churches. In France, the state reached a similar agreement with Catholic schools. In 1945, religious schools in France had depended for survival upon the limited resources of the Church; its teachers were likely to be members of religious orders. But with the Church–State concordat of 1959 assuring for them a subsidised future, the schools underwent a process of transformation, an old order adapting, as in England, to new circumstances. Teaching was professionalised and to an extent laicised; the curriculum was aligned with that of the public sector. Socially, too, their function changed. Though more likely than in England to be attended, at least temporarily, by working-class students, the higher levels of French private schooling were dominated by the children of *cadres supérieures*: as Dutercq comments, educational Catholicism frequently finds that it has no space for 'the poorest, the most vulnerable, the marginalised and those receiving state benefit'.[34] It came to serve instead as an alternative for many families to a public sector perceived as prone to violence, plagued by cultural diversity and academic failure.[35] In Italy, the constitution ruled out an accommodation of the French or English sort, but the Lateran pacts – made under Mussolini – enabled Church access to children in state schools. In addition Catholic organisations maintained an extensive network of kindergartens, *doposcuole* and child-orientated welfare activities – part of what Ginsborg terms the 'myriad world of Catholic associationism'.[36]

Problems of reform

The movements driving forward the second wave of educational reform were motivated by deep and attractive commitments, to social justice and to inclusivity. Whether measured in terms of rising levels of formal achievement, or according to less precise but possibly more revealing cultural indicators, their achievements were significant and their influence on a generation of teachers considerable. The slogans with which they were associated – equal opportunity, social desegregation, curricular transformation and an education based on the needs of learners – still have a contemporary resonance. But the weaknesses of the systems that they had helped assemble were also great. Following its 1970s apogee,

the reforming movement everywhere faced difficulties that could not be ascribed only to the influence of remaining bastions of privilege. As we shall see, this was especially clear in England, where principles of 'child-centred education' had received probably a stronger level of government approval than in other countries. 'Educashun isn't Working', the 1979 election slogan of Thatcher's Conservatives, exploited a vein of popular discontent with the achievements of reform, which extended beyond the increasingly numerous think tanks and campaigning groups of the right. To many, the reforming project seemed to have failed: its egalitarian promise had been fulfilled only partially; the pedagogic changes with which it was associated were implicated, so critics alleged, in a fall in standards; the school seemed to have become more a site for the production of social and cultural problems than a means of resolving them. Likewise in France, the successful campaigns of the Catholic Church and the right against the integrationist Savary legislation of 1983–4 catalysed a wider movement of discontent: at their height, these protests merged with a vehement rejection on the part of some intellectuals of the basic character of school reform. ('All education in the proper sense is now forbidden', wrote Jean-François Revel in response to the Legrand reforms of the early 1980s – thus initiating a line of critique that has endured into the twenty-first century.[37]) The *scuola media unificata* also appeared to be in crisis. 'Italian schools,' wrote the authors of *Red Bologna* in 1976, 'need total reconstruction ... nothing more can be achieved by isolated reforms.'[38] Yet it was in just such a piecemeal struggle that the energies of the educational and social movements of the 1970s were consumed. With the flagging of these energies, it became clear that the scale of Italian education had changed, but not its nature. Despite a formal system of equal opportunity and a vast expansion of higher education, class-based differences in student performance persisted on a spectacular scale.[39]

The post-1976 turn

How did the difficulties of the reforming project result not in its refinement or further deepening, but in its replacement by an alternative programme, to which questions of social and educational equality were not at all central? The explanation for this reorientation, in which the educational compasses of all our countries have come eventually to point in the same direction, lies outside the school. The long economic boom of *les trentes glorieuses* ended in 1973 with a recession which reduced industrial production in advanced capitalist countries by 10%. There were further severe slumps in 1974–5, 1980–2 and at the end of the 1980s.

Unemployment rose from a Western European average of 1.5% in the 1960s to 4.2% in the 1970s. By 1993 unemployment rates in the European Community had risen to 11%.[40] At the same time, the extremes of wealth and poverty both grew. Poverty, according to one French researcher, became a 'caste-like situation', a long-term prison inhabited by the young, the unemployed, the de-skilled and the downsized.[41] In 1979 an estimated 10% of British children lived in poverty – that is, in households whose income was less than half the national average; by 1993, the proportion had risen to 33%. Meanwhile, the increasing wealth of the richest section of the population was reflected in the significant expansion of private education.[42] For the public sector the immediate consequence of recession was that expenditure slowed considerably, and in some cases came to a complete stop. In Britain and in Germany, public expenditure on education as a share of GDP declined between 1980 and 1993. Only in Spain, which after the Franco years was engaged in a programme to raise spending towards Western European norms, did funding for education substantially increase, and even there government expenditure was not high enough to squeeze out a private sector which remained a central component of mass education.[43]

The slump of the mid-1970s, however, was more than a resumption of the boom-bust cycles of capitalist development. In Hobsbawm's words, 'conjunctural fluctuations coincided with structural upheavals'.[44] The closing down of unproductive units became a permanent process of deindustrialisation. The movement of capital in search of profit led to the elimination of government checks on financial transfers and to a substantial and lasting constraint on the autonomy of nation states. The conflicts attendant upon the closure of industrial plants translated very soon into a war against the post-war settlement of employment security and welfare rights. The 'probabilities of a reliable and decent wage through manual work have been radically decreased for substantial parts of the working class,' wrote Paul Willis, in relation to England, and 'the threat of its removal has become a permanent condition for all workers'; thus 'the pride, depth and independence of a collective industrial tradition' gave way to 'the indignities of flexible and obedient labour'.[45] Willis, insisting on a perspective 'from below', highlighted the consequences of this reversal for working-class youth, and charted a post-1980 history of ever-tighter regulation. Papadopoulos, writing – as it were – from above, is more cautious and elliptical:

> The combination of resource constraints, high unemployment and demographic downturn had a direct input on the demand for education

> as well as on the perception of its role and its contribution to social and economic development. Coinciding with the advent of conservative governments in a large number of (OECD) member countries, it brought a dramatic change in the political context of education. Continued growth could no longer be taken for granted either as a feasible or even a desirable objective. Constraints on public spending were particularly telling. As one of the major components of public budgets, education had to share the burden of restraint ... Resource limitations raised new questions about the setting of priority objectives, in contrast to the earlier situation where a multiplicity of educational objectives could be pursued more or less simultaneously. This scramble for priorities among different interest groups sharpened the political conflicts around education.[46]

The implications of even this guarded analysis are clear enough: with the economic restructuring that began in the mid-1970s, education embarked on a long and still-unfinished process of remaking. In this process, the forms taken by the school system in the post-war decades were subjected to fundamental and hostile scrutiny. The mixed and imprecise objectives associated with equal opportunity and the type of human capital theory that flourished in the long boom began to be set aside. Educational expansion was no longer thought to contribute *per se* to economic growth. Notions of education as an investment in human capital continued to be influential, but now 'in the more refined form of micro-economic analyses of the economic significance of individual segments of potential labour power in terms of profitability', with a view to guiding investment towards sectors 'with a favourable cost benefit factor'.[47] In short, government outlooks on education became more economised – increasingly dedicated to servicing the requirements of a new stage of capitalist development, at a low cost and with maximum efficiency; in Blair's words, 'for years education was a social cause; today it is an economic imperative.'[48] After 1975, when governments evaluated education, it tended to be through the prism of (restructured) economic priorities. Such a shift had far-reaching political consequences, since it could not be accomplished without confronting those social forces that had shaped the terms of the post-war settlement, and continued to exercise an influence over the values and everyday practices of schooling. Political conflicts did indeed 'sharpen', to use Papadopoulos's term, and have continued to sharpen since.

England and after

Even before 1979, debates in some countries had anticipated the new priorities. England was a pioneer in this respect, and its experience – inspirational for some, but for others a kind of educational spectre haunting Europe – will be a reference point to which we will frequently turn. By the mid-1970s, the Labour Government had succeeded in cooling the industrial conflicts of 1972–4 and in defeating the left of the Labour Party. An IMF loan had allowed the government to escape financial crisis, at the expense of a programme of structural adjustment that required an end to public sector expansion. In this context, the government – prompted by its civil service – began a process of reasserting control of those social institutions that it felt were out of step with its new policies. Education was first among them. 'The national mood and government policies', noted a paper on education prepared for the prime minister, 'have changed in the face of hard and irreducible economic facts.'[49] Motivated thus, Labour initiated a disavowal of the post-war settlement. What Labour began, post-1979, Thatcherite Conservatism developed, presenting the problems of schooling as a condensation of the worst effects of post-war history: bureaucracy stifled enterprise; parental rights of school choice were denied; and the unaccountable corporatist power of teachers fuelled demands for funding, drove down standards, politicised the curriculum and created a gulf between what parents and business wanted from the school and what education actually provided. Conservatism's solutions to these multiple problems involved three diverse elements. The first was marketisation – or (more strictly, since no monetary exchange takes place between provider and consumer) 'quasi-marketisation' – an accumulating set of reforms – analysed in chapter 4 – that strengthened competition and differentiation within the school system, empowered middle-class parents with 'school choice' and, via the decentralisation of financial control, created a new class of school managers. Marketisation was linked to a second element, that of stronger central regulation – the reshaping of teacher training, currricula and pedagogy so as to raise levels of examination performance and re-focus education on economic objectives. The third was an approach to social cohesion that emphasised English tradition and heritage, and sought to manage cultural diversity and changes in gender roles by a reassertion of an archaic national identity.

This mélange of neo-liberal and neo-conservative themes – of transnational economic imperatives mixed with concerns located in the

preservation of a national polity – was never fully coherent: the economisation of educational processes and objectives was incompatible with the project of restoring irreparably damaged traditions. These difficulties stemmed from fundamental tensions in the social basis and ideological perspectives not just of Conservatism but of other sections of the European right (see chapter 7), which was never *en masse* comfortable with the neo-liberal turn of the 1970s. Nevertheless, the multiple repertoire of English Conservatism served an important political purpose. It allowed Thatcher's government to link the populist energies of regressive campaigners – whose standards of excellence were the grammar school and the traditional curriculum – to a modernising critique of education's post-war failings, whose fundamental claim was that the school was out of step with economic needs. Thatcherism thus confronted teachers, trade unions and the left with a kind of war on all fronts: national regulations and newly empowered school managements weakened union influence in the workplace; media campaigns attacked child-centred and radical classroom practice; market-friendly legislation undermined local comprehensive systems; politically and ideologically, this was a set of challenges to which defenders of the still-incomplete process of post-war reform had great difficulty in responding.

In the verve of its attack on the post-war settlement, if not in the refinement of its policies, English Conservatism led the way, opening possibilities for educational change which many governments sought in some sense to emulate. But this did not mean that England simply provided a blueprint for the rest of Europe, and nowhere was the pace and aggression of Conservatism immediately or completely replicated. Italy's political crisis was such that a project of institutional transformation could not break through – though demand-led growth and the campaigns of the student movement led to the massification of higher education. In Germany, the already-close alignment of education with business priorities, as well as the continuing influence of the humanist traditions embodied in the concept of *Bildung*, seemed for a long period to guard it against an emergent neo-liberal critique.

In Spain and in France, the pattern of change was more complex. The 1980s in Spain were a period in which a 40-year West European experience of reform and reaction was telescoped into a single decade. Post-Franco education expanded very rapidly. Movements of pedagogic renewal and for the democratisation of schools flourished; national movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia weakened the hold of the central state.[50] But these shifts were not decisive. The 1978 constitution sought less to recognise national rights than to absorb them within a general

principle of regionalisation – a decentralisation which later 'served as a bridgehead of marketisation and which diffused the impact of class struggle on the central state through the dispersion of the management of public affairs'.[51] The Spanish Socialist Party's (PSOE) education law of 1985 – the Law on the Right to Education (LODE) – was likewise ambivalent. On the one hand, it fostered democratisation – establishing a principle of election for school governors and managers. On the other, it accepted in the name of educational freedom and resource constraint an agreement with the religious sector that installed private, usually Catholic, education at the heart of the Spanish system. A base for liberalisation was thus assured, with the 'critical support' of much of the left.

In France, the Mitterrand government was committed in this period to expansion: as education spending fell in England, it rose in France, even in the austerity years of the mid-1980s; in the 1980s, nursery education grew substantially, and between 1985 and 1990 the number of *lycéens* rose by 50%. Governments adopted an 80% target for the proportion of students completing a *baccalauréat* of some sort – thus taking democratisation beyond the level of the *collège*.[52] But this was an expansion qualified by sharp internecine criticism, in particular by attacks on a child-centred pedagogy that – according to a 'republican left' – downgraded questions of access to knowledge and left students adrift among the inadequate resources of subordinate cultures.[53] These criticisms of the ways in which the reforms of the later post-war years had treated the 'relationship to knowledge' created significant divisions between different wings of the reform movement; they were accompanied by a shift in educational governance that further problematised the tradition of *étatiste* reform. Via decentralisation, control of primary education passed to the *communes*, of *collèges* to the *départements* and of *lycées* to the *régions*. These debates and innovations were not immediate signs of a spreading Thatcherism; but they did constitute a set of discursive and institutional changes that at a later point would be articulated with stronger neo-liberal themes, in a much clearer, and contested, attempt to break with reformist histories.

Neo-liberalism takes stronger shape

The neo-liberal transformation of the school is a process, not an event. Its pace and rhythm have differed from country to country. They have been hastened or retarded not only by the extent of explicit resistance, but by the value systems and embedded practices existing within each nation state. Reshaping these values and practices around an authoritative

orthodoxy has required a war of attrition, or – to adapt Rudi Dutschke's expression – a long and deliberate march, on the part of neo-liberalism, through the institutions. In the language of the World Bank and the OECD, this is a process of 'strategic incrementalism', a strategy whose modes of operation we discuss in chapter 2.[54] By the late 1990s, stimulated by the Maastricht treaty, and spurred on by international organisations – such as the OECD – which were by then much more specific in their policy recommendations, the process of transformation arrived at a new stage, brought about by the joint work of governments of left and right – of Gonzales and Aznar, Major and Blair, D'Alema and Berlusconi, and Jospin and Raffarin. Although their detailed labour of law-making and administrative decree has by no means created a common system of schooling, it has nevertheless elaborated the rough and improvised project of the 1980s new right, and made it possible to codify not only the general principles of neo-liberalism, but also its operational features, as they are applied in, and inflected by, national situations.

We have already sketched the general features of neo-liberalism. We now want to highlight some more of its implications for education, and at the same time to outline the way in which these are treated in the chapters that follow. Richard Johnson and Deborah Steinberg argue that New Labour project in Britain entails 'the deepening and extending of neo-liberal social relations and individualism ... the bringing of all spheres of social life into market and commodity relations and ... the expansion of these relations globally'.[55] In their reading, Blair attempted a new phase of restructuring, in which governments and corporations embarked upon three distinct but related clusters of transformations – of 'labour and the ... economy, of citizenship and subjectivity, of management and state power'. Each of these inter-woven clusters requires substantial educational involvement.

In relation to labour, governments have a vision of a European future in which conceptions of a knowledge economy play a defining role: individual and collective competitiveness depend more and more on the continual acquisition of new competences; human capital and systems of education and training become central to economic outcomes. These notions – analysed further in chapter 2 – provide new norms of policy, often counterposed to educational cultures and disciplinary conceptions of knowledge and thought to be outdated.[56] Thus, in France, the Thélot Committee recommended to the government that instead of striving to meet the target of 80% success in the *baccalauréat*, the school should concentrate on ensuring that students acquired 'the competences necessary ... for personal life and for successful (social) integration.'[57]

From this perspective, the school needed to take over from the workplace many of the functions of apprenticeship, abandoning in the process any tendency towards providing a mass general education. Others have noted that the economising agenda goes beyond the question of vocational skills. Remaking labour power involves not just competences, but dispositions. The tendency towards merging study with training for employment, or with employment itself, contributes to the creation of a new social subject – a category of student-worker whose studies are extended, who possesses 'employability' and generic skills, who cannot expect job security and must anticipate being 'multiply deployed across a range of sites'.[58] For the school to contribute to the making of such a subject requires an emphasis on such qualities as flexibility, adaptability and creativity. These are qualities that are strongly gendered. The requirements made of the growing female workforce in many sectors and at different levels of service and professional employment involved a demand for 'emotional intelligence', communicational capacity and adaptability to change that corresponded to what Johnson and Walkerdine call 'women's tutored expertise in empathy and personal reinvention'. It is qualities of this sort which new curricula emphasise, and as they do so, the gender identities of an earlier period are problematised.[59]

The requirements of 'labour and the economy' elide into Johnson and Steinberg's second 'cluster of transformations', that of 'citizenship and subjectivity'. Besides resubjectivising pupils in the name of economic need, schools must also respond to an expanding list of other priorities – including health, sex, citizenship, sports and, in some cases, religion. Many of these tasks are carried out in the name of reconciling or controlling tensions that are thought to threaten European societies, and these tensions are increasingly described in racialised or religious terms. In an article on anti-Muslim racism in Europe, Liz Fekete writes of an attempt by states to 'steer "race relations" policy away from multi-culturalism towards monoculturalism and cultural homogenisation'. In each country, she notes, a debate about national identity has

> coalesced around a pattern of events and themes specific to that country; new policy directions have been grafted on to the approaches traditionally adopted towards minority communities. Each nation moves towards the assimilationist model in a way that is consonant with the myths upon which that nation has been built. In the Netherlands, the theme of the national debate has been 'standards and values'; in Sweden and Norway, cultural barriers to inclusion; in the UK, 'community cohesion'; in France, the principle of state

> secularism; in Germany, the primacy of the 'Leitkultur' (leading culture); in Denmark, the 'intolerant culture' amongst immigrants that prevents integration; in Spain, public safety and crime. But even though the terms through which the debate is entered differ, it is always linked back to immigrant communities and cultures and the threat that multicultural policies pose to core values, cultural homogeneity and social cohesion.[60]

The French Stasi Committee, which deliberated on the wearing of the '*voile*' by (a small number of) Muslim girls, expressed this sense of threat in especially dramatic terms – extremist groups were 'pushing young people towards a rejection of France and its values'[61] – but it is embodied in many other measures too, from Labour's introduction of citizenship classes in England, to the concern of the Spanish right with tradition and national unity: 'multi-culturalism is precisely what splits society,' said Aznar.[62] Just as significantly, this securitised discourse provides a means by which educational crises are understood by those who experience them daily: 'It feels as though we're raising criminals and terrorists here', said a teacher at a multi-racial Berlin Hauptschule whose staff were demanding its closure on the grounds that teaching there was no longer possible.[63]

The subjectivities desired by policy thus include social as well as economic attributes – a combination we explore further in chapter 8 on students and in chapter 9 on teachers. Alongside them is the last of the clusters of transformation to which Johnson and Steinberg refer – 'state power and management'.[64] As with changes in the demands made of labour, institutional reform in this area began in the later 1970s; its typical form was grasped at an early point by Nicos Poulantzas, who noted the emergence of 'networks of a semi-public or para-public character' that paralleled the organisations of the state and served to protect the state's operations from popular-democratic control.[65] As Poulantzas implies, these networks related to what was in some respects a statist project. Much has been made of 'decentralisation' and 'privatisation' as if they were measures that somehow rendered education systems newly autonomous and beyond the reach of the state. In fact, for such a system to supplant previous educational *régimes*, the active support of governments is required; and its functioning thereafter is tightly connected to state objectives. The new state forms analysed by Poulantzas depend upon that combination of decentralised operational management and detailed central regulation which has been termed the 'new public management' (NPM).[66] In this 'institutional renewal of public sector

institutions',[67] operational decentralisation in a competitive environment is meant to produce efficiencies. Stronger central direction, based on highly specific and inflexible expectations of school outputs, connects educational processes to governmental purposes. The introduction of quasi-market relationships between institutions, and also of elements of privatisation, serves both to inscribe such principles in the everyday functioning of the system, and – in the latter case – to begin the process of establishing an entry point within education for profit-seeking businesses. The whole *ensemble* – which we analyse in chapter 3 on privatisation and chapter 4 on governance – is legitimated by reference to the higher standards it will produce and to the interests of national competitiveness.

These clusters of transformation map onto a pattern of educational provision that is both expanded and differentiated. OECD statistics show a steady lengthening of the period of formal education, and some countries – Spain in the1990s, England since 2001 – have experienced absolute increases in spending.[68] But there is no overall intention of replicating the growth rates and spending levels of the 1970s; private input must increase and public spending must be cost-effective. The rule of more from less applies: in the words of the Deutsche Bank, 'an appreciable improvement in the quality of educational outcomes is not necessarily linked to an increase in educational expenditure'.[69] Nor are educational resources equally available. The policy turn advocated by expert opinion is presented as desirable and practicable for entire populations, but this universalism is in practice heavily qualified by differentiation and inequality, reflecting the effects of the knowledge economy itself. Phillip Brown points out that the American and British economies, for instance, 'are characterised by enclaves of "knowledge work" along large swathes of low-waged, low-skilled jobs'.[70] This fundamental disparity structures educational provision. On the one hand, at higher levels, competition becomes more intense: there are 'too many contestants chasing too few prized jobs',[71] and the acquisition of the credentials that underpin individual success in the labour market becomes for the middle class an absolute and often desperate priority. On the other hand, there is the problem of those who are in practice 'excluded from the knowledge society because they do not have at their disposal the means to participate in it'.[72] Though they share common anxieties, the gap between these two social categories is stark, in terms both of provision and outcome, and the inability or in some cases the explicit refusal of policy to address it is a defining feature of the new system.[73] Governments seek undoubtedly to *manage* social difference, through educational and social programmes of many kinds, but the idea that

high levels of inequality are both objectionable and eradicable has no place in policy. In the coded language of Thélot, 'the idea of success for all must not be misunderstood. It does not at all mean that the school must ensure that all its pupils achieve the highest possible level of qualification. That would be an illusory goal for individuals as well as an absurdity in social terms, since educational qualifications would no longer be linked, even vaguely, to employment structures'.[74]

Challenging the new

From one perspective, the new supranational paradigm has the status of something like an ideal type devised by policymakers: nowhere is it completely realised, and it often serves more as normative exhortation than as concrete description. To that extent, those researchers who draw attention to the continuing role of 'national and historical factors' in shaping education systems in nation states have much in favour of their case.[75] All the same, such a judgement tends to overlook the force and direction of change, the dynamic of which is generated at the international level, by a political class which has fought a common struggle, against working-class and public-sector interests, to turn the societies of Western Europe in a market-friendly direction and has developed – as chapter 2 will demonstrate – a unified sense of the next steps in educational transformation.

Notes

1. Our full debts are recorded in the notes that follow. Specifically, in relation to the themes mentioned here, we would cite the work of Roger Dale, Christian Laval, Louis Weber and their colleagues – *Le nouvel ordre éducatif mondial* (Paris: Nouveaux Regards/Syllepse, 2002); of sociologists working in the quantitative tradition, whose findings are summarised in Colin Crouch, *Social Change in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); and, in relation to new forms of regulation, Agnès van Zanten and Stephen Ball.
2. Crouch, *Social Change in Western Europe*, p. 425.
3. Our focus, throughout the book, is on the school – the set of institutions through which compulsory education is organised. As historians have made clear, the school has always been just one part of a wider system of formal and informal learning. Contemporary education policy also sees the school in this way, and we discuss the implications of this perspective in a later chapter. In many ways, however, the school retains a distinct character, and it remains possible to speak, discretely, of the social relations of schooling – in terms of the school's governance and regulation, in terms of the identities of teachers, managers, parents and students, and in terms of the kinds of tasks it is charged with addressing and the kinds of conflict that attend it.

4. David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 2.
5. Ibid., p. 3.
6. For a classic statement of this dual responsibility, see Tony Blair, 'The Power of the Message', *New Statesman* 29, September 1995, p. 15.
7. 'England' rather than 'Britain' – there are significant differences between the education systems of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales which lack of space prevents us from covering here. For an attempt at such coverage see Ken Jones, *Education in Britain* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003).
8. E.J. Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: the short twentieth century 1914–1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994) p. 274.
9. A. Wolf, *Does Education Matter? myths about education and economic growth* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2002).
10. See, e.g., Gary Becker, *Human Capital: a theoretical and empirical analysis with special reference to education* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).
11. Quoted in Louis Weber, *OMC, AGS: Vers la privatisation de la société* (Paris: Syllepse, 2003) p. 105.
12. Claude Lelièvre, 'The French Model of the Educator State', *Journal of Education Policy* 15.1, pp. 5–10, p. 7, 2000.
13. OECD, *Reviews of National Education Policies for Education: Italy* (Paris: OECD, 1998) p. 40. See also the work of Daniele Checchi, who demonstrates the ways in which the Italian education system continues to lag behind those of England, France and Germany, in terms of secondary educational attainment – *The Italian Educational System: family background and social stratification* (Università degli Studi diMilano: Dipartimento di Economica Politica e Aziendale, 2003).
14. Robert Lumley, *States of Emergency: cultures of revolt in Italy from 1968 to 1978* (London: Verso, 1990) p. 53.
15. Jean-Louis Derouet, 'Lower Secondary Education in France; from uniformity to institutional autonomy' in *Education in France: continuity and change in the Mitterrand years 1981–1985*, ed. A. Corbett and B. Moon (London: Routledge, 1996).
16. Hanna Ostermann and Ute Schmidt, 'Education, Training and the Workplace' in *Modern Germany: politics, society and culture*, ed. P. James (London: Routledge, 1998).
17. E.g., INED, *La Population et l'Enseignement* (Paris: PUF, 1970); B. Jackson and D. Marsden, *Education and the Working Class* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962).
18. A.H. Halsey (ed.), *Educational Priority: EPA problems and priorities*, vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1972) p. 8.
19. R. Moscati, 'The Changing Policy of Education in Italy', *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 3.1, pp. 55–73, 1998.
20. G. Papadopoulos, *Education 1960–1990: the OECD perspective* (Paris: OECD, 1994) p. 59.
21. Paolo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972); Daniel Lindenberg, *L'internationale communiste et l'école de classe* (Paris: Maspero, 1970); School of Barbiana, *Letter to a Teacher* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969).

22. G. Murdock, 'The Politics of Culture' in *Education or Domination?* ed. D. Holly (London: Arrow Books, 1974), p. 101; Scuola di Barbiana, *Lettere a una Professoressa* (Firenze: L.E.F., 1967) p. 112.
23. Reiffers Report (Report of the Study Group on Education and Training) *Accomplishing Europe through Education and Training* (Luxemburg: European Commission, 1996) p. 71.
24. Confindustria, *Verso la scuola del 2000. Co-operare e Competere: le proposte di Confindustria* (Document presented by Carlo Callieri, vice-president of the Confindustria to Luigi Berlinguer, Minister of Education, 30 April 1998), www.confindustria.it.
25. J-L Bernal, 'Parental Choice, Social Class and Market Forces: the consequences of privatisation of public services in education', *Journal of Education Policy* 20 (6) p. 787, 2005.
26. H-J Hahn, *Education and Society in Germany* (Oxford: Berg, 1998) p. 115.
27. Though there is now occurring a readjustment, across all *Länder*, to 12 years.
28. P. Seidl (1972) quoted in Hahn, *Education and Society in Germany*, p. 127.
29. Hahn, *Education and Society in Germany*, p. 127.
30. Crouch, *Social Change in Western Europe*, p. 239.
31. Tony Edwards and Sally Tomlinson, *Selection isn't Working: diversity, standards and inequality in secondary education* (London: Catalyst, 2002); Checchi, *Italian Educational System*.
32. Marie Duru-Bellat, *Les inégalités sociales à l'école: genèse et mythes* (Paris: PUF, 2002).
33. Rainer Geissler, *Die Sozialstruktur Deutschlands* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996) p. 259 ff.
34. Yves Dutercq, 'Administration de l'éducation: nouveau contexte, nouvelles perspectives', *Revue Française de Pédagogie* 130, janvier–mars 2000, pp. 143–70.
35. Choukri Ben-Ayed, 'L'enseignement privé en France' in *L'école: l'état des savoirs*, ed. A. van Zanten (Paris: éditions la découverte, 2000).
36. Paul Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy: society and politics 1943–1988* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1990) p. 170.
37. Quoted in Antoine Prost, 'The Educational Maelstrom' in *The Mitterrand Experiment: continuity and change in Modern France*, ed. G. Ross, S. Hoffman and S. Malzacher (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) p. 233.
38. Max Jäggi, Roger Müller and Sil Schmid, *Red Bologna* (London: Writers and Readers, 1977) p. 112.
39. Ginsborg, *History of Contemporary Italy*, p. 232.
40. Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*, pp. 405–7.
41. Serge Milano, *La Pauvreté Absolue* (Paris: Hachette Litterature, 2001) cited in Timothy B. Smith, *France in Crisis: welfare, inequality and globalisation since 1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) p. 193.
42. Jones, *Education in Britain*, p. 112.
43. Wolf, *Does Education Matter?* For Germany, Rainer Block, and Klaus Klemm, *Lohnt sich Schule*(Hamburg, 1997) p. 20.
44. Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*, p. 413.
45. Paul Willis, 'Footsoldiers of Modernity: The dialectics of cultural consumption and the 21st-century school', *Harvard Educational Review* 78 (3) pp. 390–416, p. 397, 2003.
46. Papadopoulos, *Education 1960–1990*, p. 141.

47. Jürgen Klausenitzer, 'PISA – Some Open Questions about the OECD's Education Policy', *Widersprüche 85* September 2002 (Bielefeld, Kleine Verlag) pp. 55–69.
48. Tony Blair, *Speech to National Association of Head Teachers*, 1 May 2004.
49. Department of Education and Science, *School Education in England: problems and initiatives* (London: DES, 1976) quoted in Ken Jones, *Beyond Progressive Education* (London: Macmillan 1983) p. 72.
50. Pauli Davila Balsera (2005) 'The Educational System and National Identities: the case of Spain in the twentieth century', *History of Education* 34.1 pp. 23–40.
51. Carlos Prieto del Campo, 'A Spanish Spring?' *New Left Review* 31 Jan/Feb 2005, pp. 42–68, p. 53.
52. Anne Corbett, 'Secular, Free and Compulsory: republican values in French education' in Corbett and Moon, *Education in France*, pp. 5–21.
53. A position particularly associated with Education Minister Jean-Pierre Chèvenement. See J.M. de Queiroz, 'Pédagogie et Pédagogues contre le Savoir' in van Zanten, *L'école: l'état des savoirs*, pp. 375–80.
54. See OECD, *Governance in Transition*: *public management reforms in OECD countries* (Paris: OECD, 1995) p. 84.
55. Richard Johnson and Deborah Lynn Steinberg, 'Distinctiveness and Difference within New Labour', in *Blairism and the War of Persuasion: labour's passive revolution*, ed. D. Steinberg and R. Johnson (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2004) p. 9.
56. It should be noted though that at *élite* level, education systems continue to prize traditional forms of knowledge: head teachers of English public schools, for instance, are openly sceptical of the value of competence-based qualifications; in Spain, the Law on the General Organisation of the Education System (LOGSE) of 1990 called into a being a curriculum whose elevation of 'active learning' and attitudinal objectives above disciplinary objectives served to increase the attractiveness of private education.
57. Luc Brunner and Martine Laronche, 'Ce que va proposer le rapport Thélot pour réformer l'école', *Le Monde*, 25 August 2004. The report in question is that of the committee charged with responsibility for the 'national debate' on education in France.
58. See Marc Bousquet and Tiziana Terranova, 'Recomposing the University', *Mute* 28, Summer/Autumn 2004, www.metamute.com.
59. Richard Johnson and Valerie Walkerdine, 'Transformations under Pressure: new labour, class, gender and young women' in Steinberg and Johnson, *Blairism and the War of Persuasion*, pp. 114–133, p. 117.
60. Liz Fekete, 'Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State', *Race & Class* 46 (1) 2004, 3–29, p. 18.
61. Stasi Report (2003), quoted in Sharif Gemie, 'Stasi's Republic: the school and the "veil"': December 2001–March 2004 in *Modern and Contemporary France*, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 387–97, p. 391.
62. *European Race Bulletin*, no. 4 (2002), quoted in Fekete, 'Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State', p. 19.
63. 'No Solution other than Police Presence for Unruly Berlin School', *Deutsche Welle* 1 April 2006, www.dw-world.de.
64. Johnson and Steinberg, 'Distinctiveness and Difference within New Labour', p. 8.

65. Nicos Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism* (London: NLB, 1978).
66. NPM is discussed in more detail in chap. 4. See also John Clarke and Janet Newman, *The Managerial State* (London: Sage, 1997).
67. OECD, *Governance in Transition: public management reforms in OECD countries* (Paris: OECD, 1995) p. 7.
68. For Spain, see OECD, *Education at a Glance*, Paris: OECD, 2002, pp. 145–53; for England, DfES, *Departmental Annual Report 2004* (London: DfES, 2004).
69. Deutsche Bank-Research, *Mehr Wachstum für Deutschland*, 2003, p. 7.
70. Phillip Brown, 'The Opportunity Trap: Education and Employment in a Global Economy', *European Educational Research Journal* 2.1, 2003, pp. 141–79, p. 150. See also Crouch, op. cit., chap. 8.
71. Brown, 'The Opportunity Trap', p. 152.
72. Reiffers Report, 'Accomplishing Europe through Education and Training', quoted in Nico Hirtt, Im Schatten der Unternehmerlobby, Die Bildungspolitik der Europaischen Kommission, in *Widersprüche* 83 (Bielefeld: Kleine Verlag, 1996) pp. 37–51.
73. 'From 1986 to 1999, the 10% of students experiencing the least schooling saw investment in their education increase from 2850 to 165000 francs. The 10% receiving the most schooling received extra investment in the range of 254,000 – 438, 000 francs.' Pierre Merle, *La Démocratisation de l'Enseignment* (Paris: La Découverte, 2002) p. 91.
74. Thélot, quoted in Nathalie Duceux, 'Du rapport Thélot à la loi Fillon', *Critique Communiste*, 174 Hiver (Paris: LCR, 2004) pp. 12–22.
75. See, for example, Andy Green, Alison Wolf and Tom Leney, *Convergence and Divergence in European Education and Training Systems* (London: Institute of Education, 1999).